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COMMON PROBLEMS AFFECTING SUPRANATIONAL ATTEMPTS IN AFRICA: 
AN ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW 
 
B Fagbayibo 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Ever since the colonial era, attempts have been made, throughout the various 
regions of Africa, at building supranational units chiefly for both administrative and 
legal convenience. Examples of such attempts include the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland, the East African High Commission and the Federations in former 
French West and Equatorial Africa, all of which were attempts at forging a 
supranational nation state.  
 
These "federations" could not withstand the intricate dynamics of the independence 
tsunami, mainly because the post-independence political elite consolidated 
colonially-defined national territorial integrity and sovereignty. Instead, efforts were 
geared towards establishing supranational organisations at sub-regional levels to 
cater for functional economic needs. At the continental level, the OAU Charter was 
far from establishing a continental supranational organisation. Rather, emblems of 
supranationalism remain prominent at the sub-regional levels: the East African 
Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and 
the Organisation for Harmonisation in Africa of Business Laws (OHADA). 
 
It is against this background that this article aims at investigating selected attempts 
at supranationalism on the continent, the successes and failures of such 
experiments, and the lessons to be learnt from them. As Africa embarks on the 
journey of solidifying its unity through the establishment of leviathan continental 
institutions, efforts should be geared towards building on the experiences of past 
                                                          
  Babatunde Fagbayibo. LLB (UNISA), LLM (Pretoria), LLD (Pretoria). Senior Lecturer, Department 
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fagbabo@unisa.ac.za. This article derives from the author’s thesis: Fagbayibo B A Critical 
Politico-legal Framework for Integration in Africa: Exploring the Attainability of a Supranational 
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and present experiments at the sub-regional level. Such experiments offer 
instructive lessons as they are rooted in similar historical and social contexts. 
 
Thus, this article begins with an analysis of supranationalism. This is followed by an 
outline of attempts at supranationalism within Africa. It concludes by discussing 
some of the common challenges, as evident in the foregoing analysis, facing 
(supranational) integration in Africa. 
 
2 The supranational focus 
 
Supranationalism is a politico-legal concept which embodies but is not limited to the 
following core elements: decisional autonomy (in particular the rule of the voting 
majority as opposed to consensus), the binding effect of the laws of international 
organisations (where member states are precluded from enacting contradictory 
laws), the institutional autonomy of an organisation from its member states, and the 
direct binding effect of laws emanating from regional organisations on natural and 
legal persons in member states.1 Essentially, supranationalism implies the existence 
of an organisation capable of exercising authoritative powers over its member 
states. This is the point where supranational organisations are different from 
intergovernmental institutions, since the latter are merely forums for inter-state 
cooperation. In this respect, the legal personality of an institution will determine 
whether or not it is a supranational institution. 
 
Legal personality is the concept which defines "the actual attribution of rights and/or 
duties (of international organisations) on the international plane".2 Such attributes 
are expressly or tacitly stipulated in the constituent treaty.3 The constituent treaty 
will for example indicate the procedural capacity of an international organisation to 
make treaties, enforce its decisions and enter into agreements with other entities.4 
Similarly, such powers could be inferred from the powers and objectives of the 
                                                          
1  Weiler 1981 YEL 267-306. See also Hay Federalism and Supranational Organisation 69 and 
Pescatore Law of Integration 51-52. 
2  Shaw International Law 194. 
3  Shaw International Law 909. 
4  Shaw International Law 191. 
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particular organisation. It is important to note that the extent of the functions of a 
particular organisation determines the level of its legal personality. For example, an 
organisation such as the European Union (EU) has a more extensive legal personality 
than the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU). This is because the EU, 
unlike the latter, has moved from the minimal threshold of inter-state cooperation to 
the creation of institutions parallel to and/or superseding the jurisdiction of its 
member states in relation to agreed matters of common interest.5 
 
It must, however, be emphasised that the discourse on supranationalism should not 
begin from an "all-or-nothing" perspective. Any enquiry into the presence or lack 
thereof of supranational elements should not only be directed at identifying 
overarching supranational features but in addition should engage in highlighting the 
hybridity or juxtaposition of elements – intergovernmental and supranational. The 
reality is that even when an organisation possesses all of the elements of 
supranationalism, there are still some embedded features of intergovernmentalism. 
The EU, for example, is designated as a supranational organisation, but one of its 
primary decision-making organs, the Council of European Union, consists of national 
ministers who primarily champion the agenda of their governments.6 The Council 
remains the apical decision-making body on matters relating to foreign policy, justice 
and home affairs.7 Also the UN, an archetypal intergovernmental organisation, 
exercises supranational powers especially in relation to voting rules in the General 
Assembly and sometimes in the Security Council.8  
                                                          
5  The EU exercises both exclusive and shared competence in a number of areas. It has exclusive 
competence over matters such as its customs union, economic and monetary policy, competition 
laws, the common international trade policy, the common fisheries policy and the conclusion of 
some international agreements. It shares competence with member states on a wide range of 
issues such as food, the environment, social policy, transport, human rights and development 
aid. Available on European Commission official website (EC Date unknown http://bit.ly/YPSEv1).  
6  Dashwood 1998 E L Rev 205-206. 
7  Dashwood 1998 E L Rev 205-206. 
8  Weiler 1981 YEL 305. 
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3 Overview of selected supranational attempts in Africa 
 
3.1 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
 
The earliest manifestation of pan-African integration can be traced to West Africa.9 
Intertwined with the nationalist struggle against colonialism, activists from (British) 
West Africa, as early as the mid-nineteenth century, advocated for regional 
cooperation through either a federal arrangement or the establishment of common 
institutions such as the Court of Appeal and a university.10  
 
Decolonisation in the early 1960s further intensified efforts at integration mainly by 
the political elite, a marked shift from the previous advocacy by non-state actors.11 
Concrete attempts to transform the "idea" of West Africa into an institutional form 
started in 1972 when the leaders of Nigeria and Togo, Generals Gowon and 
Eyadema respectively, signed a bilateral Treaty designed as a launch-pad for wider 
sub-regional cooperation.12 On 28 May 1975 fifteen West African states converged in 
Lagos to sign the treaty establishing ECOWAS.13 The economic focus of the 1975 
treaty can be gleaned from some of its objectives, which include the elimination of 
customs duties, the free movement of persons, capital, and services, and the 
harmonisation of agricultural and industrial policies.14 
 
The stark reality of a fast-changing global political and economic order,15 especially 
the realisation that the 1975 Treaty proved inadequate at deepening regional 
                                                          
9  Thompson Africa and Unity 28. See also Kufuor Institutional Transformation 19-21 and Asante 
Political Economy of Regionalism 45-47. 
10  Thompson Africa and Unity 28; Kufuor Institutional Transformation 19-20; Asante Political 
Economy of Regionalism 45-47. 
11  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 20-21. 
12  Asante Political Economy of Regionalism 55. 
13  These states include Benin, Burkina Faso (formerly Upper Volta), Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
Cape Verde acceded to the ECOWAS Treaty in 1977. In 1999/2000 Mauritania withdrew its 
membership from ECOWAS. 
14  Article 2 ECOWAS Treaty (1975). 
15  Kufuor identifies the following as some of the factors that necessitated the move towards 
supranationalism in ECOWAS: the need for institutional efficiency; the search for political 
legitimacy by ECOWAS leaders; ideological change within West Africa; the desire for stronger 
regional security architecture; and the need to be a major player in international trade.  
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integration, led to the establishment in May 1990 of a Committee of Eminent 
Persons to review the 1975 Treaty.16 One recommendation of the Committee was 
that more emphasis should be placed on supranationalism within ECOWAS, 
especially the vesting of more powers on the organs of the community.17 The 
Committee’s report formed the basis of the 1993 revised Treaty of ECOWAS.  
 
To underscore its mission of institutional transformation, the Authority in June 2006 
approved the transformation of the Executive Secretariat into a nine-member 
Commission with a President, a Vice-President and seven Commissioners.18  
 
Having experienced some of Africa’s worst armed conflicts, ECOWAS found it 
important to put in place a supranational security mechanism.19 In this regard the 
security architecture of ECOWAS has been adjudged as one of the best on the 
continent.20 ECOWAS has successfully intervened in hot-spots such as Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea Bissau.21 Learning from the past mistakes of its interventions 
across the sub-region, ECOWAS has established an overarching, all-inclusive security 
mechanism which consists of a Mediation and Security Council, a Defence and 
Security Commission, and a Council of Elders.22 The Mediation and Security Council 
is made up of ten members, and decisions are made by a two-thirds majority of six 
members.23 In addition, civil society is encouraged to contribute to the organisation’s 
early warning system mechanism.24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
See Kufuor Institutional Transformation 40-46. 
16  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 132-170. 
17  Kufuor Institutional Transformation 146. 
18  See the ECOWAS Newsletter 2006. Available on the ECOWAS official website (ECOWAS Date 
unknown http://bit.ly/YtEMgE). 
19  According to Adebajo, the three civil conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau claimed 
over 250,000 lives and generated over 1.2 million refugees. See Adebajo 2005 Internationale 
Politik und Gesellschaft 90. 
20  Cilliers 2008 Institute of Security Studies Papers 13-14. 
21  Adebajo 2005 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 90. 
22  Adebajo 2005 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 90. 
23  Adebajo 2005 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 90. 
24  Adebajo 2005 Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 90. 
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3.2 Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)  
 
The SACU25 was established in 1910, thus making it the world’s oldest Customs 
Union.26 Its origins date back to the 1889 Customs Union Convention entered into 
between the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope and the Orange Free State 
Boer republic.27 The 1910 agreement extended membership of the organisation to 
the British High Commission Territories (HCT) of Basutoland (now Lesotho), 
Bechuanaland (now Botswana) and Swaziland. Namibia (then South West Africa) 
was a de facto member because it was then administered by South Africa.28 The 
underlying idea behind this arrangement was to incorporate the HCTs into South 
Africa.29  
 
The 1910 agreement tasked the SACU with supranational duties by providing for the 
free movement of manufactured products, a common external tariff on all goods 
imported into the Union, and a revenue-sharing formula for the distribution of 
customs and excise.30 Under this agreement South Africa was to receive 98.7% of 
the joint revenue, Bechuanaland 0.27%, Basutoland 0.88% and Swaziland 0.15%.31 
Another feature of the SACU is the 1974 Rand Monetary Agreement (RMA), which 
made the rand the only legal tender within SACU.32 However, Botswana pulled out of 
the arrangement in 1975. To address the concerns of other member states, 
especially in relation to independent monetary control, the agreement was amended 
in 1986 by giving more autonomy to Lesotho and Swaziland.33 
 
                                                          
25  It consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. Except for South Africa 
the member states are commonly referred to as the BLNS states. 
26  SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
27  SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
28  SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
29  The electoral victory of the National Party in South Africa in 1948 signalled the impossibility of 
such a move. See Gibb 1997 JSAS 75-76. 
30  Gibb 1997 JSAS 75. 
31  Gibb 1997 JSAS 75-76. 
32  AU and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 185. 
33  AU and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 185. 
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Growing concerns about certain policies emanating from South Africa, which largely 
resulted in trade diversion34 and subsequently had a negative impact on the GDP of 
other member states, led to the replacement of the 1910 agreement by the 1969 
agreement.35 The 1969 agreement attempted to address the major source of 
contention, namely the revenue-sharing formula,36 by making provision for the 
inclusion of excise duties in the common revenue pool.37 This revenue pool is divided 
among the member states according to the annual imports, production and 
consumption of dutiable goods.38 Based on this arrangement, the revenue share of 
member states, except for South Africa, is further enhanced by an annual 42% 
compensation allowance.39 
 
These measures did little to change the status quo, mainly because South Africa still 
retained the sole decision-making power over policies affecting the customs union 
arrangement.40 South Africa’s transition to democratic governance and the 
independence of Namibia set the tone for a renewed engagement on SACU 
policies.41 These negotiations gave birth to the 2002 SACU Agreement. To highlight 
the importance of joint decision-making, the new agreement created an independent 
administrative body (the Secretariat) to oversee the SACU.42 Other independent 
institutions include the SACU Council of Ministers, the Commission, the National 
Bodies, the Tariff Board, the Technical Liaison Committees and a Tribunal.43 On the 
contentious issue of revenue sharing, the new agreement provided for a revised 
formula which consists of customs, excise and development components.44  
                                                          
34  According to Gibb, trade diversion "occurs when a customs union adopts a protectionist external 
trade regime forcing member states to displace imports of efficiently produced goods from 
countries outside the trading arrangement with more expensive imports from partner countries". 
See Gibb 1997 JSAS 78.  
35  Gibb 1997 JSAS 75. 
36  The revenue derived from the SACU’s common external tariff represents a significant source of 
economic development in the BLNS countries. According to Ngwenya, it makes up approximately 
50% of Swaziland’s and Lesotho’s budget revenues, and 30% and 17% of the budget revenues 
of Namibia and Botswana. See Ngwenya 2002 Sisebenze Sonke 26. 
37  Gibb 1997 JSAS 77. See also SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
38  Gibb 1997 JSAS 77. 
39  Gibb 1997 JSAS 75-76. 
40  SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
41  Alden and Soko 2005 JMAS 370-371. 
42  Article 3 SACU Agreement (2002).  
43  Article 7 SACU Agreement (2002). 
44  SACU Date unknown http://bit.ly/102Dxkm. 
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Compared to other sub-regional entities, the SACU can claim far-reaching and 
substantial achievements such as the harmonisation of policies on competition, 
investment and intellectual property rights.45 In addition, the organisation also has a 
relatively successful framework for engaging with external parties such as the EU 
and the United States of America.46 
 
3.3 The East African Community 
 
East African integration dates back to the attempt by the British colonial authority to 
build an economic bloc and at the same time secure greater political control over the 
region.47 Prior to the 1926 Governors’ Conference, which laid a groundwork for 
future areas of cooperation, the region witnessed the establishment of supranational 
institutions such as the Kenya-Uganda Railway,48 the Court of Appeal for East Africa 
(1902), a common currency (1905), a Postal Union (1917) and a Customs Union 
(1917).49  
 
After a series of recommendations and reports highlighting the feasibility of closer 
integration in the region,50 the East Africa High Commission (EAHC)51 was officially 
established in 1948. The headquarters of the EAHC were situated in Nairobi, Kenya. 
The Commission comprised the Governors of Kenya, Tanganyika (later Tanzania) 
and Uganda, the administrator, a Commissioner for Transport, a Postmaster General 
and a Legal Secretary. The Legislative Assembly, with the consent of the High 
Commission, had the power to enact laws for the three territories.52 The activities of 
                                                          
45  Alves, Draper and Halleson 2007 http://bit.ly/YB4KZQ. 
46  Alves, Draper and Halleson 2007 http://bit.ly/YB4KZQ 18. 
47  Ojeinda 2005 E Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 221-222. 
48  The construction of this railway in 1894 is commonly regarded as the start of the integration 
process in the region. See Odhiambo "East African Customs Union" 214. 
49  Ojeinda 2005 E Afr J Peace & Hum Rts 222. 
50  Delupis East African Community 19-26. 
51  Delupis observes that the EAHC was not an international organisation strictu sensu because its 
members were colonial entities. See Delupis East African Community 31. 
52  Some of the important Acts enacted by the Assembly include the Railways and Harbours 
Administration Act, the Customs Management Act, the Income Tax Management Act and Acts 
setting up institutions of higher learning in East Africa. See Banfield "Structure and 
Administration" 32. 
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the High Commission covered a whole range of fields such as aviation, 
telecommunications, income tax, customs and excise, science and research, defence 
and education.  
 
Being a colonial construct the EAHC’s legitimacy was largely questioned by the 
majority of East Africans. They, in particular the leading political elites in the three 
territories of the region, questioned the composition of the commission, the loyalty 
of its members and its detachment from the realities on the ground.53 The sharp 
disapproval of the EAHC was also fuelled by the quest for independence in the three 
territories. Political elites viewed the Commission as a vestige of the British Empire 
and were determined to wrest the control both of their territories and the 
organisation from the colonists. 
 
The continued opposition to the functioning of the EAHC led to discussions between 
the East African leadership and their British counterparts. An agreement was finally 
reached and the EAHC was replaced in December 1961 by a new institution called 
the East African Common Services Organisation (EACSO). 
 
The EASCO differed from its predecessor in a number of ways. Apart from the fact 
that it was established by an agreement among the three East African governments, 
the constitution also provided that the executive would be responsible to the three 
East African governments.54 Unlike its predecessor, the EASCO reflected an African 
outlook by ensuring that East Africans were placed in leadership positions. The 
Central Legislative Assembly, for example, had more East Africans among its 
membership.55  
 
The EASCO served as a platform for enhancing cooperation among the territories. 
The political elites of the territories viewed the independence of their respective 
territories as the first step, followed by the creation of a Federal East African state. 
In 1963, the political leaders of the East African states - Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), 
                                                          
53  Banfield "Structure and Administration" 34. 
54  Banfield "Structure and Administration" 32. 
55  Banfield "Structure and Administration" 36-37. See also Springer "Community Chronology" 15. 
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Julius Nyerere (Tangayika)56 and Milton Obote (Uganda) - signed a declaration of 
federation.57 The declaration, amongst other provisions, aimed at establishing a 
Federation of East Africa.58  
 
Pursuant to endowing the organisation with more powers and based on the 
recommendations of the Phillip Commission, the East African Community Treaty was 
signed in Kampala, Uganda on 6 June 1967 and was inaugurated in Arusha on 1 
December, 1967. The East African Community (EAC) incorporated the EASCO. In 
terms of the institutional machinery, there was a major change in terms of the 
appointment of the members of the Legislative Assembly. Unlike the EASCO, where 
members of the Legislative Assembly were elected through a system of direct 
election by state legislatures, member states were now given the authority to select 
members of the Assembly.59 This act stifled the performance of the Assembly since 
the new members’ loyalties lay with the national powers and thus prevented them 
from being critical of the national authorities.60 The Common Market Tribunal, the 
Court of Appeal for East Africa and the East African Industrial Court jointly held the 
judicial powers.61 
 
The EAC inherited the organisational structure of the EASCO. It functioned through 
its organs:62 the East African Authority; the East African Legislative Assembly; the 
East African Ministers; the Tribunals and the East African Development Bank. The 
EAC also operated the following Common Services: the East African Highway 
Cooperation (EAAC), the East African Posts and Telecommunications Cooperation 
                                                          
56  In 1964 Tangayika and Zanzibar united to form Tanzania. 
57  See "The Federation Declaration" of 5 June 1963. The Declaration was issued by the 
governmens of East Africa in Nairobi on 5 June 1963. 
58  As a result of Uganda’s stiff resistance to surrendering sovereignty in respect of citizenship and 
foreign affairs, the idea of a political union was deemed no longer feasible. A major consequence 
of this was the 1965 decision to dismantle the East African Currency Board, thus introducing 
separate currencies in the three member states. See Delupis East African Community 49-50, 53. 
59  Springer "Community Chronology" 22. 
60  Springer "Community Chronology" 22. 
61  The Tribunal had the power to hear cases relating to the alleged violations of the Common 
Market and also to give advisory opinion to the Common Market Council. The Industrial Court 
could rule only on disputes of an industrial nature while the jurisdictional competence of the 
Court of Appeal was determined by the national laws (Springer "Community Chronology" 23). 
62  Article 3 Treaty for East African Cooperation (1967). 
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(EAP&TC), the East African Railways Cooperation (EARC) and the East African 
Harbours Cooperation (EAHC).  
 
Alongside the European Community it was widely acclaimed as one of the best 
experiments in regional cooperation. One would have expected that the shared 
values of the member states should be sufficient to hold the organisation together. 
As Mazzeo rightly pointed out, a multiplicity of factors (political and economic) 
contributed directly and indirectly to the dissolution of the community.63 The 
disbanding of the East African Currency Board, a year after the signing of the EAC, 
was seen as the first ominous development in the long road towards the eventual 
dissolution of the community.64 This particular act ensured that the member states 
effectively removed the idea of a monetary union from the radar screen of the 
community.65  
 
The revival of the EAC, after its demise in 1977, had its origin in article 14.02 of the 
Mediation Agreement of 1984. In terms of this agreement, three heads of state 
(Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) agreed to "explore areas of future co-operation and 
to make concrete arrangement for such co-operation".66 The preparatory work for 
the re-establishment of the EAC began in 1993 when the three heads of state signed 
the Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for 
East African Co-operation. The Treaty establishing the East African Community was 
signed in Arusha on 30 November 1999. The Treaty entered into force in 2000. 
Article 9 of the EAC Treaty outlines the following as the institutions of the 
community: the Summit, the Council, the East African Court of Justice, the East 
African Legislative Assembly, the Secretariat, the Sectoral Committees and the 
Coordination Committees.67 In a milestone development, Burundi and Rwanda 
became members of the EAC on 1 July 2007. 
 
                                                          
63  Mazzeo "Experience of the East African Community" 151. 
64  Mugomba 1978 JMAS 264. See also Odhiambo "East African Customs Union" 215. 
65  Odhiambo "East African Customs Union" 215. 
66  EAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/X13X8f. 
67  See the EAC Treaty (1999).  
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In order to avoid the pitfalls of the past the preamble of the Treaty identified the 
following as the reasons for the dissolution of the old EAC:68 a lack of strong political 
will; a lack of private sector and civil society participation; disproportionate sharing 
of benefits among partner states; and the inability to address these issues. The 
objectives of the EAC are, amongst others:69 
  
 to establish a Customs Union (launched in 2005); 
 to establish a Common Market (launched in 2010); 
 to establish a Monetary Union (expected to be launched before the end of 
2012, it is not yet in operation); and ultimately  
 to establish a Political Federation. 
 
In order to avert the mistakes of the past vis-à-vis the benefits being skewed in 
favour of Kenya, the Customs Union Protocol provides for the duty-free movement 
of all exports from Tanzania and Uganda into Kenya.70 Goods from Kenya moving 
into Uganda and Tanzania are classified into two categories: Category A qualifies for 
immediate duty-free treatment while the goods in Category B would be subjected to 
gradual tariff reduction over a period of 5 years.71 
 
3.4 Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique des Droit des Affaires 
(OHADA) 
 
The OHADA (in English, the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in 
Africa) remains one of the boldest attempts at supranationalism on the continent. 
The character of the OHADA Treaty, which was adopted on 17 October 1993, is 
essentially pro-development and business inclined.72 Built around the existing 
economic and political relations among francophone African countries,73 the Treaty 
                                                          
68  EAC Treaty (1999). 
69  Article 5 EAC Treaty (1999). 
70  Article 11 Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union (2009). 
71  Article 11(3) Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union (2009). 
72  See generally, Dickerson 2005 Colum J Transnat'l L 17-73. 
73  Each of the OHADA member states belongs to the two major French-based economic and 
monetary zones: West Africa – Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) and 
Central Africa - Communaute Economique et Monetaire l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC).  
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aims to accelerate economic development and foreign investments in member states 
through the provision of a secure judicial environment. The Treaty regulates - 
through the Uniform Acts - the following areas: company law, general commercial 
law, securities, enforcement measures, insolvency law, arbitration, accounting law 
and transport.74 At present there are sixteen member states spread across west and 
central Africa.75 Since the majority of the member states are francophone countries, 
the OHADA laws are largely based on the French legal system.76 In pursuant of the 
goal of continental integration, the Treaty provides that membership is open to all 
member states of the AU.77  
 
An important supranational component of the Treaty is the provision which 
stipulates that the Uniform Acts are immediately applicable in the domestic laws of 
each member state.78 Unless specified otherwise (in the Uniform Act), the Treaty 
provides that Uniform Acts shall enter into force 90 days after their adoption.79 In 
addition, the Uniform Acts shall have direct effect, allowing any party to rely on its 
provisions 30 days after their publication in the OHADA official journal.80  
 
The OHADA Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) is one of OHADA’s 
strongest supranational institutions.81 The CCJA has two functions vis-à-vis OHADA 
laws: an arbitration centre and a Supreme Court for judgments delivered by national 
Courts of Appeal. However, the role of the court as an arbitration centre remains 
                                                          
74  OHADA Date unknown http://bit.ly/108BPfz. 
75  They include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon. Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. 
Most of the OHADA members are francophone countries with a few exceptions: Equatorial 
Guinea (Spanish), Guinea -Bissau (Portuguese) and the English speaking parts of Cameroon.  
76  The laws of Guinea Bissau (which was colonised by Portugal) and Equatorial Guinea (colonised 
by Spain) are similar to those of the French legal system. This was due to the influence of the 
French Commercial Code on the Spanish and Portuguese laws. These laws belong to the civil law 
tradition. See La Porta et al 1998 Journal of Political Economy 1118.  
77  General Clause Title 1, Article 53 OHADA Treaty (1993). The following countries have signified 
their intentions to join the organisation – the Democratic Republic of Congo (which is in the 
process of becoming a member), Ghana, Nigeria and Liberia. See Carton and Cousin 2007 
http://bit.ly/16dnpA9.  
78  Article 10 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
79  Article 9 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
80  Article 9 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
81  The other is the Council of Ministers, which is the legislative arm of OHADA. It is responsible for 
the adoption of Uniform Acts. See Article 3 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
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undeveloped.82 As the Court of last resort in terms of the OHADA laws, the CCJA 
plays a primary role in ensuring that there is uniform application of the OHADA laws 
in member states.83 In respect of interpretation of the treaty, both the member 
states and the Council of Ministers may approach the Court in this regard.84 Appeal 
to the Court can be instituted either by one of the parties to the proceedings or by 
referral of a national court.85 In relation to the enforcement of the Court’s decisions, 
the Treaty entrusts the member states with this function.86  
 
3.5 The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU/UEMOA) 
 
WAEMU is one of two CFA franc zones in Africa, the other being the Central African 
Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). Built around a common, convertible 
currency - the CFA franc - and a shared colonial heritage,87 the WAEMU was 
established in 1994 as a measure to address the attendant effects of the devaluation 
of the CFA franc and in turn, to strengthen the economic cooperation among 
member states.88 The objectives of the organisation include the harmonisation of 
laws, the creation of a common market, and the convergence of the macro-
economic policies of member states.89  
 
The supranational ambition of the organisation is affirmed in article 6 of the UEMOA 
Treaty.90 Lavergne notes that the supranational nature of the UEMOA can be 
inferred from four functions highlighted in the treaty:91 
 
                                                          
82  Dickerson 2005 Colum J Transnat'l L 56. 
83  See Articles 13-18 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
84  See Article 14 OHADA Treaty (1993). On a number of occasions the CCJA has ruled that the 
OHADA laws are superior to any conflicting national laws. See Dickerson 2005 Colum J Transnat'l 
L 56. 
85  Article 15 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
86  Article 20 OHADA Treaty (1993). 
87  The original seven members - Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo - 
are francophone countries. Guinea-Bissau, a Portuguese-speaking country, later joined the group 
in 1997. 
88  Masson and Pattillo Monetary Union in West Africa 8-9. See also Alexander, Oleynik and Oliynik 
WAEMU Business Law Handbook 6-7. 
89  Article 4 UEMOA Treaty (1994). 
90  Article 6 states that the UEMOA’s statutes are superior to the laws of member states. 
91  Lavergne "Regional Integration and Cooperation in West Africa" 18-21. 
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 Supranationality over monetary matters 
 The prohibition of the application of new protectionist measures against 
member states (Article 77) 
 The obligatory nature of institutional directives, regulations and decisions 
(Article 43) 
 The existence of surveillance mechanisms and sanctions (Articles 64, 65, 72-
75) 
 
The institutional architecture of the organisation comprises of the Conference of 
Heads of State, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice, the Commission and 
the Central Bank of the States of West Africa (BCEAO).92 The BCEAO is the 
institution that truly reflects the supranational status of the organisation.93 It is the 
institution solely responsible for the issuing of currency on the territory of its 
member states and also for monetary policy within the zone.94 In this regard the 
BCEAO has been commended for pursuing prudent monetary policy amidst 
worsening economic performance in some member states.95  
 
Among the achievements of the WAEMU since its inception are the convergence of 
macro-economic criteria, the harmonisation of business laws (especially indirect 
taxation regulations), and the establishment of a customs union and a common 
external tariff. 96 
 
3.6 The Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) 
 
As previously stated, the CEMAC97 is the second CFA Franc zone in Africa. In 1994 
the CEMAC replaced the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), an 
organisation that had been established in 1961 to promote monetary cooperation 
                                                          
92  WAEMU Date unknown http://bit.ly/X50p55. 
93  See eg Busch 2009 http://bit.ly/WPcxpp. 
94  Busch 2009 http://bit.ly/WPcxpp. See also Alexander, Oleynik and Oliynik WAEMU Business Law 
Handbook 6-7. 
95  See IMF 2001, http://bit.ly/WRp0J0. 
96  AU and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 30. 
97  Of the six members of the organisation, five - Cameroon, Central Africa, Congo, Gabon and Chad 
- are former French colonies. The sixth member, Equatorial Guinea, is a former Spanish colony.  
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among francophone central African nations.98 The CEMAC, like the WAEMU, aims to 
create a common market, harmonise laws and sectoral policies, and promote the 
convergence of the macro-economic policies of member states.99 The organisation is 
made up of the following institutions: the Conference of the Heads of States, the 
Council of Ministers, the Community Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Bank 
of Central African States (BEAC).100  
 
As with the WAEMU, the BEAC is the supranational institution responsible for issuing 
the CFA Franc within the zone and in addition controls the monetary policy of the 
zone.101 At present the CEMAC has in place financial and legal (harmonisation of 
business laws) regulatory mechanisms.102  
 
However, the customs union is yet to function effectively largely as a result of the 
low level of intra-community trade, bureaucratic bottlenecks that hinder the free 
flow of goods and services, and the lack of political will to fast-track integration.103 
 
4 Common factors hindering the maximal realisation of 
supranationalism in Africa 
 
As is evident in the preceding discussion, experimentation with supranationalism is 
not novel in Africa. Some of the organisations discussed above have made 
considerable progress on certain fronts, especially on monetary, security, business 
and judicial matters. Setting the tone for continental integration, these institutions 
have made often modest but sometimes bold incursions into issues bordering on 
state sovereignty. Although mainly working within the rigid context of the over-
bearing influence of member states, organisations like the CEMAC and the WAEMU 
have put in place structures for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the 
monetary policies of member states. The OHADA framework ensures, through its 
                                                          
98  CEMAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZMMIpU (translated version).  
99  CEMAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZMMIpU (translated version). 
100  CEMAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZMMIpU (translated version). 
101  CEMAC Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZMMIpU (translated version) 
102  AU and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 29. 
103  World Bank Date unknown http://bit.ly/ZQjAy5. 
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institutions, the supranationality of its jurisdiction on matters relating to the 
harmonised business laws. In a series of interviews conducted by Dickerson with 
various stakeholders across OHADA member states, optimistic views were expressed 
about the success of the process, especially in relation to the execution of 
judgments.104 In the SACU, the revenue derived from the Common External Tariff 
(CET) amounts to a significant portion of the budget revenue of its member 
states.105 All of these facts point to the beneficial nature of supranationalism and its 
potential in addressing some of the continent’s problems.  
 
In spite of the achievements outlined above, there is still room for improvement. As 
will be shown below, the worrying question relates to the glaring disconnect 
between commitment to supranationalism at public fora and the creation of an 
enabling environment for it to be operational. Put simply, there has been a gross 
lack of political will on the part of Africa states to translate goals and objectives into 
reality.106  
 
Thus, this section will attempt to tease out some of the obstacles to integration in 
Africa, especially within the context of supranationalism. In essence, the discussion 
will primarily focus on the factors responsible for the inability of regional 
organisations in Africa to exercise supranational powers. 
 
4.1 Weak institutional machinery 
 
A major impediment to operationalising supranationalism in Africa is the fact that 
regional institutions are not independent enough to implement integration initiatives. 
These institutions are expected to operate in accordance with the whims of member 
states which are often run by dictators with personal interests at heart, rather than 
to fulfil the ambitious objectives of the organisation. It is thus not uncommon to see 
                                                          
104  Dickerson 2005 Colum J Transnat'l L 65. 
105  It makes up approximately 50% of Swaziland’s and Lesotho’s budget revenues, and 30% and 
17% of the budget revenues of Namibia and Botswana. See Ngwenya 2002 Sisebenze Sonke 26. 
106  See eg Thompson 1990 Afr J Int’l Comp L 86. 
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the dissolution or derailment of integration initiatives based on the change of 
government in member states, or personal differences among heads of state.107  
 
The dissolution of the first EAC is a classical case. The 1971 military putsch in 
Uganda quickened the eventual demise of the community. Julius Nyerere, being a 
close friend to the overthrown Milton Obote, disliked Idi Amin, the new Ugandan 
leader.108 As Garba109 notes, both Nyerere and Amin threw caution to the wind by 
verbally abusing each other at public forums. The functioning of the community was 
adversely affected by this enmity.110 This was because the decision-making powers 
resided with the heads of states and government. 
 
There is a strong nexus between the effective implementation of integration 
initiatives and the autonomy of regional institutions. The ability of these institutions 
to act above member states in respect of specific areas of common interests ensures 
that integration is firmly placed in capable and neutral hands and insulated from the 
vagaries of national politics. It also guarantees that integration proceeds at a 
significant pace since decisions will not always be taken unanimously or by 
consensus. In the case of the OHADA, it could be argued that the successful 
implementation of the harmonisation of business law is largely attributable to an 
independent and reliable Court of Justice.111 The same could be said about the 
BCEAO and BEAC as independent institutions within the WAEMU/UEMOA and the 
CEMAC respectively.  
                                                          
107  In relation to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), some analysts have 
expressed concern about the continued existence of the programme, especially after its main 
architects, Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki, retired from office as presidents of their 
respective countries. See eg Dowden Africa 534. Since the retirement of both presidents, the 
momentum that heralded the establishment of the programme has largely dissipated.  
108  Nyerere also resented the fact that Idi Amin was seen by white minority regimes in Southern 
Africa as an archetypical embodiment of the failure of black African leadership. See Gregorian 
"Plowshares into Swords" 189. 
109  Garba Diplomatic Soldering 125. 
110  As Mazzeo observed, the East African Authority, the highest decision making organ of the 
community, had no meeting in seven years as a result of this clash. See Mazzeo "Experience of 
the East African Community" 156. 
111  In a series of interviews conducted by Dickerson with various stakeholders in OHADA member 
states, many expressed their optimism about the success of this initiative and also praised the 
clarity of OHADA laws vis-à-vis the execution of judgments. See Dickerson 2005 Colum J 
Transnat'l L 65. 
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Another factor that hampers the smooth running of integration initiatives is the lack 
of funds. The epileptic state of the economies of some African states, coupled with 
their obligations to pay annual dues to the various sub-regional organisations they 
belong to, largely contributes to their inability to discharge their financial 
obligations.112 There is no gainsaying the point that the availability of funds is crucial 
for the virility of any organisation, most especially an organisation charged with the 
responsibility of furthering a capital-intensive project - regional integration and co-
operation.113 
 
4.2 Non-implementation of key integration initiatives 
 
As stated earlier, one of the core features of supranationalism is the binding nature 
of the laws emanating from the international institutions. In order for such laws to 
have teeth, it is necessary that they either enjoy equal legal status with domestic 
laws or in some cases supersede them. This is where the doctrinal question of the 
relationship between international and domestic law comes into the picture.  
 
In international law, there are three theories governing such a relationship: monism, 
dualism and harmonisation.114 According to monists, law is hierarchical, with 
international law and domestic/national law being part of the same legal order.115 
Therefore, international law applies in the domestic system without any need for its 
incorporation.116 Dualists view that international law and domestic law are two 
distinct fields of law.117 Furthermore, in order for international law to be binding in 
the domestic system, there is a need for some process of incorporation or 
                                                          
112  The issue of overlapping and multiple memberships will be discussed below. 
113  In CEMAC for example, it has been observed that the lack of funds has made it impossible to 
retain or hire qualified staff (IMF 2005 http://bit.ly/YDkvPV). In their analysis of the problems of 
finance in the African Union (AU), Ncube and Akena highlight that the organisation functions 
each year with only 50-60% of its required finance, and that only 1.9% of the total budget is 
targeted for regional integration programmes (Ncube and Akena 2012 http://bit.ly/14juxwz).  
114  Dugard International Law 43-47. 
115  Dugard International Law 47. 
116  Dugard International Law 43-47. 
117  Dugard International Law 47-48. 
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transformation.118 Lastly, the harmonists seek to arrive at some form of convergence 
by holding that where there is a conflict between the application of international law 
and domestic law, the court should apply the rules operative within its jurisdiction.119 
The consequence of this is that the court may apply either of the two.120 
 
Placing these theories within the African context, the issue is not so much the nature 
of the legal framework, be it monist or dualist, but rather the lack of political will to 
domestically implement international law in the form of integration programmes 
such as the elimination of tariffs and the free movement of persons.121 In spite of 
the agreement on the free movement of persons and goods within ECOWAS, it has 
been observed that security agents continue to harass and intimidate citizens across 
ECOWAS frontiers.122 Also, the proposed common currency for the West African sub-
region, the Eco, which was expected to be launched in December 2009, remains 
unlikely due to the non-implementation of convergence criteria by member states.123 
The routine disregard or non-implementation of these policies decimates the 
relevance of the institutional machinery.124  
Also related to the above discussion is the issue of the dichotomised legal tradition 
bequeathed to Africa by colonisation. A principal effect of colonisation is the 
adoption of the legal system of the colonists. African countries therefore have 
divergent rules and regulations governing specific issues. Citing the example of the 
Mano River Union (MRU), Thompson shows how the income tax regime in Sierra 
Leone, colonised by Britain, frustrates foreign investment, while the tax regime in 
                                                          
118  Umozurike Introduction to International Law 30. 
119  Umozurike Introduction to International Law 31. 
120  Umozurike Introduction to International Law 30. 
121  Thompson 1990 Afr J Int’l Comp L 90. See also Kufuor 1996 Afr J Int’l Comp L 6-7. 
122  Bakare The Punch 67. In 1983, the Nigerian government, in contravention of the ECOWAS 
Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, expelled nationals of ECOWAS member states from its 
territory. See Kufuor 1996 Afr J Int’l Comp L 33. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of 
Persons and the right of residence and establishment were enacted in 1979. The Protocol 
guarantees the free entry of citizens from member states without visa for 90 days. The free 
entry aspect of the Protocol was ratified in 1980, and the right of residence aspect was ratified in 
1986. The component on the right to establishment is yet to come into force. 
123  The West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) is a monetary arrangement among five countries: 
Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana. See Obayuwana and Okwe 2009 
http://bit.ly/108o2FO. 
124  According to the IMF, in spite of the establishment of a customs union within WAEMU and 
CEMAC, the momentum of integration continues to be slowed down by member states’ non-
compliance with key convergence criteria. See IMF 2005 http://bit.ly/YDkvPV 16. 
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Liberia, influenced by the United States of America, is more favourable.125 The 
consequence of such dissimilarities is the uneven implementation or outright 
disregard of policies by member states.126 This reality is more evident in the 
preference of some African states to integrate around shared legal system (eg 
OHADA and WAEMU). There is no doubt that a shared legal system makes 
integration easier, especially with regard to the harmonisation of laws.  
 
Yet it is equally important that in order to translate the vision of continental 
integration into practice member states should be prepared to embark on the 
reconciliation of laws in various areas. In this regard more efforts should be made to 
identify the common denominators in each of the legal systems and, more 
importantly, to devise laws which suit the peculiarities of Africa.127 
 
4.3 Crowded integration landscape 
 
The proliferation of regional organisations is an indicator of the failure of African 
states to genuinely commit to a single, well-thought-out and implementable 
programme.128 The competing objectives and programmes of these institutions 
ensure that member states are unable to wholly adhere to the supranational 
programmes of the various institutions they belong to. This lack of coordination 
provides an avenue for non-commitment to supranational objectives. Although the 
Constitutive Act provides that the AU must "coordinate and harmonise the policies 
between the existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the objectives of 
the Union",129 the AU is yet to adopt the Protocol which will provide a legal 
                                                          
125  Thompson 1990 Afr J Int’l Comp L 96. 
126  Thompson 1990 Afr J Int’l Comp L 94-97. 
127  See eg Fagbayibo 2009 CILSA 321-322. 
128  According to a ECA survey, the following points were identified as the reasons why African 
countries join more than one REC: strategic and political reasons; economic reasons; 
complementarity; historical reasons; geographical proximity; the need for additional external 
resources; political pressure; and cultural vision. See AU and ECA (n 32) 52-54. 
129  See Article 3(l) of the African Union Constitutive Act (2001). 
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framework for the relationship between it and the RECs.130 In order to address this, 
a number of views have emerged on how to rationalise the RECs.131  
 
As long as the landscape of African integration is defined by the existence of multiple 
RECs with overlapping and replicated membership, integration will remain a mirage. 
Integration cannot be achieved in a situation where the constituent agencies are 
pulling in different directions. To effectively proceed with the rationalisation process, 
a detailed audit of each of the fourteen RECs should be carried out with the purpose 
of determining their viability and relevance to the integration process. The audit 
should establish key points such as the proximity of each REC’s activity to the 
realisation of the steps outlined by the Abuja Treaty, the feasibility of limiting the 
membership of states to one REC, the delineation of duties and objectives among 
the RECs, the synchronisation of their policies, and the consequence(s) of narrowing 
down the number of the RECs to five. 
 
                                                          
130  See the Draft Protocol on the Relationship Between the Regional Economic Communities (REC) 
and the AU EX/CL/158(1X). 
131  The UN Economic Commission also proposed five possible scenarios: a) Managing the status 
quo, b) Rationalisation by merger and absorption, which would entail the merging of existing 
RECs in order to come up with 5 RECs in each of Africa’s sub-region, c) Rationalisation around 
rooted communities, which calls for the creation of RECs according to common characteristics 
such as geography, ethnicity and sociology. d) Rationalisation by division of labour, which divides 
cooperative efforts into regional and sub-regional programmes, categorising them according to 
the interests of the countries in the same region and e) Rationalisation through harmonisation 
and coordination, which aims at the harmonisation and coordination of trade liberalisation, and 
macro-economic convergence policies and criteria of the current regional economic blocs. See AU 
and ECA Assessing Regional Integration 115-126. The AU Commission has also proposed four 
possible rationalisation scenarios: a) Maintaining the status quo, b) Maintaining the tenets of the 
Abuja Treaty within a shorter time frame, c) Rationalisation by anchored community, d) 
Rationalisation of a political decision by heads of state. See Report of the meeting of experts on 
the rationalisation of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) held in Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso. 27-29 March, 2006. 
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4.4 Skewed distribution of benefits and hegemonic threats 
 
One of the principal motivations behind a state’s participation in regional integration 
initiatives is the expectation of immediate and long-term welfare gains. In a situation 
where a country loses out on the benefits accruing from integration schemes, there 
is a strong possibility of such a country either committing half-heartedly to 
integration objectives or completely pulling out.132 As Molle points out, two reasons 
underlie the need for redistribution policies in a regional integration scheme. The 
first is the "efficiency argument," which holds that the uneven distribution of benefits 
such as production factors and economic activities prevents the economy from 
reaping full profits and attaining maximum potential.133 The second is the "equity 
argument," which states that inequality is socially unacceptable and morally 
unfair.134 
 
The position with regional integration in Africa is that the countries with the 
strongest economies end up deriving maximum advantage, to the detriment of other 
member states. For example, in the old EAC Kenya, due to its relatively developed 
economy, benefited more than the other partner states. Various measures were put 
in place to address this imbalance. The transfer tax system was adopted to ensure 
that industries in Uganda and Tanzania operated efficiently through the provision of 
additional budgetary revenues.135 A related measure was the East Africa 
Development Bank’s (EADB) decision to increase its investment in the less 
industrialised states.136 Due to its limited resources, the EADB could not achieve a 
significant result in this regard.137 Another criticism levelled against the bank was 
that it invested in projects which had little effect on the strengthening of the 
economies of member states. One of the measures taken in an attempt to ensure 
redistribution was the relocation of the headquarters of common services and the 
                                                          
132  Molle 1997 Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series 7-8. 
133  Molle 1997 Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series 8. 
134  Molle 1997 Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper Series) 9. 
135  Mazzeo "Experience of the East African Community" 153. 
136  The Bank’s development activity was unevenly distributed in order to benefit the less developed 
member states: Tanzania (38.75%), Uganda (38.75%) and Kenya (22.5%). See Fredland "Who 
killed the East African Community" 65-66.  
137  Mazzeo "Experience of the East African Community" 155. 
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decentralisation of the operations. The lack of clarity with regard to the objective of 
decentralisation brought about a position in which there were two centres of power: 
the Community on the one hand, and the country headquarters on the other.138 
 
These measures, in spite of their well-intentioned aims, were insufficient to redress 
imbalances which had their roots in the colonial administrative configuration. The 
low level of development of member states accentuated even the slightest trace of 
inequality. This situation exacerbated the rivalry in the Community and thus 
contributed to the dissolution of the Community.  
 
As noted earlier, the transformation of the SACU from an organisation "cast in 
imperialist mould"139 into an institution of equals led to the review of the revenue-
sharing formula. Alden and Soko observe that South Africa, due to its developed 
infrastructure and currency, remains the dominant partner in the SACU relationship 
In spite of the generous and favourable revenue-sharing formula.140 The fact that 
the South African rand remains the legal tender within the zone, except for 
Botswana, means that member states cannot exercise independent fiscal and macro-
economic policies without South Africa’s consent.141 
 
In a situation where regional hegemons solely dictate and determine the pace of 
integration, there is bound to be the decimation of the influence of regional 
organisations. In such a scenario regional organisations become the mouth-piece of 
regional powers and thus lose legitimacy and the support of smaller member states. 
This situation is pointedly explained as follows: 
 
[T]he more obvious the existence of a regional hegemon, the more vigorous the 
rejection amongst smaller states. The independence of this variable in relation to 
“national identities” is based on the fact that asymmetry can be perceived as a 
hazard without this being based on national sentiments: citizens can shirk 
supranational projects involving a much larger entity due to fears that the lack of 
                                                          
138  Mazzeo "Experience of the East African Community" 154-155. 
139  Alden and Soko 2005 JMAS 373. 
140  Alden and Soko 2005 JMAS 372-273. 
141  Alden and Soko 2005 JMAS 372. 
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influence of their own country within the arrangements will harm local interests, 
regardless of their attitudes towards the concept of nationhood.142 
 
While the influence of regional hegemons in any integration process cannot be 
completely wished away, the point being made is that it is essential that mechanisms 
which allow the indispensability of smaller member states in the decision-making 
process are put in place. 
 
4.5 Political instability 
 
It is trite knowledge that the implementation of integration objectives demands 
some level of political stability in member states. Supranational organisations can 
(effectively) assert their control and influence only in a stable climate. The fact that 
integration programmes require domestic and uniform implementation, for example, 
lends credence to this assertion. The instability in most African countries as a result 
of election rigging, the intimidation of the opposition and of the citizenry clearly 
frustrates the attainment of the uniformity of standards and objectives. From Gabon 
to Ethiopia, Zimbabwe to Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea to the Gambia, African 
leaders continue to make a mockery of the core principles of good governance and 
democracy. This has in turn spurred a litany of perennial conflicts plaguing the 
continent.143  
 
The negative impact of armed conflicts on the continent’s economy cannot be over-
emphasised.144 According to the IMF, the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, the largest country 
in the WAEMU zone, impacted negatively on the economic situation of the whole 
zone.145 Conflicts undermine the integration process by creating distrust among 
member states and more importantly the diversion of funds that could have been 
                                                          
142  MacClanahan 2004 http://bit.ly/10daoCG.  
143  See eg Cilliers 2005 http://bit.ly/14nsKqk. 
144  It is estimated that over a period of 15 years, 1990-2005, Africa has lost $284 billion to conflicts 
and wars. The continent’s economy has also within this period shrunk by an average of 15% 
yearly. See Oxfam, IANSA and Saferworld 2007 http://bit.ly/ZlTq6j.  
145  See International Monetary Fund 4. 
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used to promote and sustain integration initiatives.146 Such commitments should 
include the devolution of monitoring and disciplinary powers to regional institutions. 
With such powers, regional institutions would be able to promptly intervene in 
(potential) conflict situations and also impose relevant sanctions on errant member 
states. 
 
4.6 Democratic deficit 
 
The centrality of democracy to the integration process cannot be understated. As 
previously highlighted, integration requires the uniform application of standards and 
objectives. In this regard, member states are expected to embrace and practise the 
principles of good governance and democracy. The need for adherence to 
democratic values is even more pertinent considering the fact that the onus of 
enforcing decisions is placed on member states. If integration is understood as a 
process which not only promotes the establishment of common institutions but also 
the upliftment of individuals, then it is crucial that these individuals are able to 
exercise their democratic rights. As Habib et al point out: 
 
These norms are critical to further deepen integration… Africa will unite faster if 
Africans embark on democratisation drives and create democratic institutions based 
on the logic of the self-empowerment of the people on the foundation of an 
effective and engaged state civil society nexus.147 
 
The problem with the integration process in Africa is that the people are excluded 
from matters relating to integration. Decisions and policies emanating from regional 
integration are neither subjected to referendums nor to broad consultation with the 
people concerned. The consequence is that the people know little about the 
integration process and thus attach little or no significance to the regional 
institutions. It thus begs the question: If some African leaders are not prepared to 
                                                          
146  It is also estimated that about 24 African countries have spent around USD300bn on conflicts 
since 1990. See Oxfam, IANSA and Saferworld 2007 http://bit.ly/ZlTq6j 3. 
147  Habib, Muchie and Padayachee 2006 http://bit.ly/ZQestQ. 
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allow democratisation at the national sphere, what is the probability of their 
encouraging it at a transnational or regional level?  
 
Even when integration is exclusively based on business and monetary matters (e.g. 
OHADA, WAEMU and CEMAC), the idea of democracy and good governance cannot 
be totally removed from it. While some may argue that matters like these have 
nothing to do with human rights, the reality is that the absence of the rule of law in 
member states may also have negative effects on the willingness of potential 
investors.  
 
As long as the commitment to democratic values remains within the realm of 
rhetoric, integration initiatives will continue to flounder, unable to attain their full 
potential. Therefore, it is essential that regional institutions are bequeathed with the 
necessary powers to monitor compliance with democratic standards in member 
states. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This article provides an analysis of supranational experiments within Africa. It further 
offers an insight into the organisational framework of such experiments. Like other 
regional integration schemes, African integration has had its fair share of problems. 
Africa has never been in short supply of integration initiatives. The problem with 
them, however, lies mainly in the lack of sufficient political will in member states to 
translate their idealistic statements into concrete action.  
 
Political will, beyond the oft-cited problem of the weak economic structures of 
African states, plays a major role in the success of any integration process. As is 
evident from the relative success of the OHADA, the granting of the requisite powers 
to regional organisations is fundamental. It is not suggested that political will is the 
only requirement for a successful regional integration process, but it certainly helps 
firm up the foundation on which virile cooperation may be built. 
 
B FAGBAYIBO  2013(16)1 PER / PELJ 
59 / 536 
 
The success of supranationalism on the continent could be enhanced by learning 
from the experiences of organisations that have attempted to establish leviathan 
institutions. As shown in this article, the problems experienced by these 
organisations are similar. It is simplistic to assume that addressing the factors 
discussed above will guarantee the effective operation of supranationalism in Africa. 
Nevertheless, working towards understanding these obstacles and gradually 
correcting them would be a necessary first step. 
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